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ABSTRACT:  The neuroscience of imagination has revealed extensive 
parallels between the brain correlates of creative cognition and 
those of social cognition. There is, however, scarcely any 
exchange of ideas between the different research communities 
that is aimed at understanding what such commonalities reveal. 
The evidence indicates that there are some fundamental 
similarities in the very nature of the information processing 
mechanisms that underlie cognitive and social aspects of mental 
life that are customarily viewed to be quite distinct from one 
another. This chapter features reflections on these similarities by 
generating cross-connections between creative cognition and 
social cognition. Themes that are explored include candidate 
mechanisms of correspondences between creativity and social 
behaviour, such as the ‘intention to communicate’ (by means of 
expression), the ‘drive to understand’ (by means of inference 
and discovery), and the ‘personal relevance bias’ (by means of 




The neuroscientific approach to investigating creativity refers to the study of brain 
basis of the mental operations that underlie creative ideation (Abraham, in press; 
Jung & Vartanian, 2018). The creative brain has been the subject of concerted 
investigations for a few decades now, and there are several consistencies in the 
patterns of findings that are reported regardless of whether one adopts a ‘global’ or a 
‘local’ approach. Global approaches focus on large-scale brain networks when 
interpreting the brain correlates of creativity, whereas the spotlight in local 
approaches is far more circumscribed in that it is limited to local brain regions or 
brain activity patterns (Abraham, 2018).  
 
It is clear now that there is no single brain region or brain network that is purely 
specialized for creative cognition. While the functional roles and dynamics of the 
array of brain regions and brain networks that are implicated in creative ideation are 
slowly becoming clearer, most insights from brain research remain at the level of 
mere description. Few scholars attempt to infer beyond surface activity patterns to 
consider what these patterns reveal about the fundamental nature of mental 
operations applied to the context of creativity. If the brain areas involved in creative 
cognition overlap with those of normative cognition, this requires considering not only 
the differences but also the similarities between creative and non-creative aspects of 
cognition.  
 
Let’s take the example of the global brain networks perspective, the currently 
influential trend in creative neurocognition. Abundant evidence has shown the 
contribution of regions within the default mode network (DMN) and the central 
executive network (CEN) in orchestrating creative cognition (e.g., Abraham et al., 
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2012; Beaty, Benedek, Kaufman, & Silvia, 2015; Ellamil, Dobson, Beeman, & 
Christoff, 2012; Limb & Braun, 2008). In general terms, these brain networks are 
distinguished in terms of their functional profiles. The DMN is called upon in contexts 
of internal mentation, whereas the CEN is engaged in contexts that necessitate 
cognitive control in goal-directed thought and action. These two networks are 
normally anticorrelated (Fox et al., 2005), which means that when one is highly 
engaged or more active the other one is relatively inactive. A third network of the 
brain, the Salience Network (SN), which is primed to detect behaviourally relevant 
stimuli, largely determines which of these two networks will be engaged at any given 
time depending on what is necessitated by the currently relevant context. So the SN 
modulates the switch between the DMN and CEN, such that it triggers the CEN 
when external goal-directed processing is required and, alternatively, the DMN when 
a situation calls for internal spontaneous processing. What do we know so far about 
the functions of these networks?  
 
The CEN is engaged during goal-directed tasks that require executive function and 
cognitive control, such as working memory, inhibitory control, task switching, 
controlled semantic retrieval, problem solving and reasoning (Cole & Schneider, 
2007; Niendam et al., 2012). The anterior and lateral prefrontal cortices of this 
network occupy central focus in the context of creativity as they are involved during 
analogical reasoning, conceptual expansion, lyrical improvisation, metaphor 
processing, musical improvisation, problem solving and story generation (Abraham 
et al., 2012; Fink et al., 2009; Green, Kraemer, Fugelsang, Gray, & Dunbar, 2012; 
Kröger et al., 2012; Limb & Braun, 2008; Liu et al., 2012; Rutter, Kröger, Stark, et al., 




The DMN, in contrast, is strongly engaged during rest, and includes medial regions 
of the prefrontal cortex (Buckner, Andrews-Hanna, & Schacter, 2008; Raichle, 2015). 
The functional profile of this network is such that these regions are engaged during 
different types of social and self-referential imaginative thought processes. These 
include autobiographical and episodic memory (e.g., remembering my last day as a 
student at university), episodic future thinking (e.g., imagining what my next house 
will be like), mental state reasoning or theory of mind (e.g., making inferences about 
what my date is thinking), self-referential thinking (e.g., reflecting on my own 
behavior earlier that day), and moral reasoning (e.g., judging the permissibility of my 
boss’s behavior). These operations can be either directly prompted (i.e., within a 
study using experimental design to assess the same) or spontaneously elicited 
under at rest and when performing cognitively undemanding tasks during which 
mind-wandering inadvertently takes place (Andrews-Hanna, Reidler, Huang, & 
Buckner, 2010). 
 
The core brain regions within the SN (Goulden et al., 2014) include the dorsal 
anterior cingulate cortex and the orbital frontoinsular cortices (Uddin, 2015) of which 
the latter mediates “dynamic interactions between other large-scale brain networks 
involved in externally oriented attention and internally oriented or self-related 
cognition” (Menon & Uddin, 2010). The insula is characterized by its sensitivity to 
bottom-up salience which account for how it determines when to switch between 
engaging the DMN or the CEN. Recent work using brain functional connectivity 
analyses has shown that hub regions across all three networks – DMN, CEN and SN 




So where does this evidence take us? In a bid to uncover the differences between 
creative and non-creative cognition, we have fundamentally ignored the need to 
consider the similarities between them. The rest of this chapter is devoted to 
showcasing the advantage of following this novel approach by exploring the 
candidate mechanisms of correspondences between creativity and social behaviour. 
The three that will be described include the ‘drive to understand’, the ‘intention to 
communicate or evoke’, and the ‘personal relevance bias’. 
 
The Drive to Understand (by Means of Inference & Discovery) 
The human brain is increasingly being understood and portrayed as an engine of 
prediction and proactive processing (Bar, 2009; Bubic, von Cramon, & Schubotz, 
2010; Clark, 2013). Through our sense organs we are constantly statistically 
sampling the information in our environments and form expectations based on 
context-specific consistencies. This is a rapid and dynamic process and one that is 
optimized for efficiency, which is why we experience our perceptual world as a 
smooth and continuous. Indeed, if we attended to every single stimulus in our 
environment as though it were an entirely new stimulus with no contextual 
connection to any previously experienced stimulus, we would be incapable of 
functioning in the usual rapid, smooth and continuous manner as the information 
processing demands would be perpetually overwhelming. Under such 
circumstances, accuracy in stimulus processing would be very high but we would 




One of the ideas for the types of algorithms that might be applicable in generating 
quick and efficient processing, which generates the ability to engage with the 
environment with a sufficiently high level but not perfect of accuracy, was postulated 
by Daniel Dennett. He proposed that the brain uses three mental shortcuts to 
categorise events that we experience (Dennett, 1987). The ‘physical stance’ is 
applied when an event can be understood by means of the natural forces in the 
world (e.g., A ball that is thrown up will fall down to the floor). The ‘design stance’ 
applies when an event can be explained with reference to the manner in which 
stimuli in that context are designed for a specific function (e.g., A ball that emits 
flashing lights whenever it is bounced on the floor has been designed to do through a 
designed connection between pressure and light). Events that cannot be explained 
through either the physical stance or the design stance are viewed through the lens 
of the ‘intentional stance’ where the events are interpreted as intentional or goal-
directed (e.g., A ball that is thrown up suddenly stops falling to the ground and 
instead lingers in the air and moves around erratically).  
 
The DMN has been characterized as priming the intentional stance (Spunt, Meyer, & 
Lieberman, 2015), as it is often involved in when inferring the mental states of 
others. Inference generation is a key component of mental state reasoning as one s 
not privy to the contents of another person’s mind. Mental state reasoning, also 
commonly referred to as mentalizing or theory of mind, together with other 
operations that are engaged the DMN such as episodic memory, episodic future 
thinking, self referential processing and moral cognition, has been classified as 
falling into the category of ‘intentionality-based imagination’ as it elicits information 
processing mechanisms that are “predominantly recollective in nature with a view to 
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establishing the best possible explanation of a situation or event in question. This is 
brought about by means of spontaneous access to an extensive and diverse 
repertoire of relevant knowledge when processing such contexts. The best or most 
plausible explanation is the one that fits best with what is already known in terms of 
oneself and/or one’s worldview” (Abraham, 2016: 4203).  
 
A key point to note though is that while the DMN regions are strongly engaged in 
these contexts of social and self-based cognition, they are also involved in contexts 
that are not explicitly social or self-based, but still call upon or necessitate similar 
computational demands. The dorsal aspect of the medial prefrontal cortex, for 
instance, is involved in inference generation across contexts – discourse processing, 
humour, etc. – regardless of the sociality of the background context (Ferstl & von 
Cramon, 2001, 2002; Siebörger, Ferstl, & von Cramon, 2007). So the discovery of 
coherence within a context that comes about by making an associative or inferential 
leap (between two statements, for instance) leads to heightened activity in this core 
DMN region regardless of whether it involved non-mental state reasoning (e.g., The 
lights have been on since last night. The car doesn’t start.) or mental state reasoning 
(e.g., Mary’s exam was about to begin. Her palms were sweaty.).  
 
A further example of where a similar case can be made is that of another core DMN 
region – the temporal poles. This region, which forms the anterior-most extent of the 
left and right temporal lobe, is held to be critical in the representation and retrieval of 
social script knowledge (Olson, McCoy, Klobusicky, & Ross, 2013; Wang et al., 
2017). From the context of mental state reasoning, this region is held to be a 
repository of sorts for social script knowledge that we draw on to generate inferences 
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during social cognition (Frith, 2007; Frith & Frith, 2006; Saxe, Carey, & Kanwisher, 
2004). What is fascinating this is that abundant literature within the field of semantic 
cognition show that the temporal poles are the hub zone where conceptual 
knowledge seems to be stored amodally and/or multimodally (Fairhall & Caramazza, 
2013; Jefferies, 2013; Patterson, Nestor, & Rogers, 2007). So the temporal poles 
house abstract, amodal and multimodal representations of conceptual knowledge, 
regardless of whether the information is categorized social or non-social. The key 
attribute to not focus on here is which type of information activates this region ‘more’, 
as this essentially reflects some core facet of the information that is being processed 
to a greater degree. If one introspects on the difference in one’s conscious 
experience of social information (e.g., one’s boss, the face of a stranger, an interview 
with Tilda Swinton) versus non-social information (e.g., a menu card, the sound of a 
the rain, the smell of a department store), it should be fairly obvious that social 
information encoded in a manner that is more amodal or multimodal and more highly 
associative per se than non-social information. This could be the reason why social 
information processing engages the temporal poles more than non-social information 
processing. However, the fact that all types of conceptual knowledge evoke activity 
in this region begs us to consider what is the common denominator. And the answer 
is that this region is not engaged when processing unimodal or modality-specific 
information, but instead when processing abstract, amodal and multimodal 
information. So the ability to infer and discover new associative connections within 
one’s conceptual space is necessarily incumbent on being able to draw upon this 
form of representation.  
 
The Intention to Communicate and Evoke (by Means of Expression) 
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Let us think for a moment about why we create. It is clear that human beings are an 
extraordinarily creative species. Although the term ‘creativity’ is typically associated 
with prominence and productivity in the arts as well as invention and discoveries in 
the sciences, it is in fact central to virtually all domains of human life, including 
industry, policy-making, services and community development, as creativity is the 
foundation from which innovation and progress emerges (Sawyer, 2012). This is to 
be expected given that the need to be creative is typically viewed as central to the 
human self-actualization drive (Maslow, 1943), which refers to the need that each of 
us have to realize our unique potential in the form of distinctive achievements and 
personal growth throughout our lives.  
 
This drive to create is not given nearly enough focus in the literature despite the fact 
that its power is unmistakable. Let us take the example of de novo artistic skills. This 
refers to the sudden emergence of visual artistic and musical abilities in people who 
did not previously exhibit such tendencies following brain injury or neuronal 
degeneration (B. L. Miller et al., 1998; Z. A. Miller & Miller, 2013). This unexpected 
release of artistic behaviors is believed to reflect the drive to communicate and 
express oneself in the face of the inability to do so effectively due to language 
impairments that are symptomatic of such conditions (Zaidel, 2014). As the 
customary route of expression is thwarted in this context, the turning to art is viewed 
as an alternative means of personal expression for the purpose of communication. 
Indeed, the healing power of engaging with the arts, given that it allows for unique 
self-expression and promotes resilience, has been highlighted in relation to several 
clinical disorders, so much so that positive interventions in relation to the same are 
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advocated in such contexts (Assael & Popovici-Wacks, 1989; Forgeard & Eichner, 
2014; Forgeard & Elstein, 2014; McFadden & Basting, 2010).  
 
What is more, creative expression does not occur in a vacuum, but within a social 
context. It is after all when our creations resonate with others that our ideas gain 
traction. In fact, the “set of social institutions, or field, that selects from the variations 
produced by individuals those that are worth preserving” is one of the three main 
shaping forces that determine the degree of creativity associated with an output 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1988).  
 
The response of others, both real and imagined, to the outputs of one’s generativity 
is central to the process of creative ideation. Neuroscientific evidence does in fact 
indicate that we are highly tuned to the factors that facilitate understanding of 
information being imparted in our social world. For instance, the N400 is a well-
studied event-related potential (ERP) which indexes the detection of semantic and 
world knowledge violations (e.g., The colour of milk is orange) during language 
comprehension (Kutas & Federmeier, 2011; van Berkum, Hagoort, & Brown, 1999) 
and is of key relevance to creative cognition (Kröger et al., 2013; Rutter, Kröger, Hill, 
et al., 2012). The sensitivity of the N400 also extends to social contexts as it is 
preferentially engaged when faced with culturally specific social norm violations (Mu, 
Kitayama, Han, & Gelfand, 2015) and is influenced by the knowledge of other 
listeners. For instance, participants who had knowledge about a language stimulus 
but knew that a co-listener could not know the same, showed a N400 response when 
listening to the stimulus with the co-listener but not when hearing the stimuli alone 




The fact that we are sensitive to the knowledge of others and our brain activity 
indicates selective responsivity for the same has powerful implications for 
understanding how a keen awareness of both our knowledge of others and our 
power to evoke emotional and behavioral responses in others shapes our ability to 
create products that have a deep resonance with others in our social space.  
 
The Personal Relevance Bias (by Means of Alertness to Salience to Self)  
The relevance of the DMN in the information processing of social and self-relevant 
information has been highlighted in a previous section. Several studies using a range 
of different paradigms have indicated that certain brain regions within this network, 
particularly ventral aspects of the medial prefrontal cortex, are particularly sensitive 
to the degree of self-relatedness or personal relevance of the information (Mitchell, 
Macrae, & Banaji, 2006; Murray, Schaer, & Debbané, 2012; Northoff et al., 2006; 
van der Meer, Costafreda, Aleman, & David, 2010). This means that the greater the 
degree of similarity of the information being processed is to oneself, the higher the 
activity in these specific brain regions. The paradigms in these cases typically entail 
the evaluation of entities, i.e., people who are similar to oneself in terms of physical 
attributes, personality characteristics, filial association, political leaning, and so on. 
However, the bias towards self-similarity applies beyond explicit entity-based 
contexts (Abraham, 2013). It need not involve explicit evaluations of people, and the 
contexts need not involve living beings at all. Indeed, one characterization of the 
ventral medial prefrontal cortex held that this region mediates the “identification and 




An impressive example of a study that showed the activity of this region in contexts 
that neither involved real entities nor necessitated explicit evaluative judgments was 
one that involved simple and neutral geometric forms such as a two-dimensional 
circle (Sui, Rotshtein, & Humphreys, 2013). Participants tagged forms with labels for 
themselves, their best friend, and an unfamiliar other. Self-tagged responses were 
associated with greater engagement of the ventral medial prefrontal cortex and 
faster response speed. This finding of advantageous in information processing even 
in contexts of arbitrary and transitory self-object associations indicate that personal 
significance is automatically encoded in the brain and our information processing is 
modulated by the same (Roye, Jacobsen, & Schröger, 2007). We are involuntarily 
oriented and alerted towards stimuli in the environment that personally relevant. That 
the salience associated with personal relevance generalizes to contexts that are not 
explicitly socially or self-focused is the key point to note here. Topics, themes and 
ideas that drive our individual fascinations and passions have a deep personal 
significance for us. We are alert and aware to a heightened degree to anything in our 
environment that informs the interests of our minds, and in the case of the creative 
drive, this automatic attuning towards and gathering of this form of personally 
significant information influences our capacity for inventiveness and generativity.  
 
Concluding Thoughts 
It would be erroneous to regard the three aforementioned drives as mutually 
exclusive as they are fully interwoven capacities that dynamically influence one 
another. Delving into the literature on the social brain to seek correspondences 
between creative and social cognition allows one to derive much that is vital about 
the dynamics of creativity. The utility of this focus often goes unnoticed as most 
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efforts are directed at outlining the differences between creative and non-creative 
cognition. Adopting this alternative approach of comprehending the nature of the 
commonalities between the same seems just as crucial to understanding how 
creativity emerges across contexts. The importance of considering the impact of 
one’s social milieu cannot but be central to this process.  
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